Yemen Part 3 - the Hot Take

Still with me? Because we're going to the first hot take.

One thing I want to make clear - the general assumption that the Houthis are proxies for Iran is just plain wrong. In Yemen, they are the most grassroots group. Their relationship with Tehran is completely unlike what is implied. The Houthis are self-funding (through extorting their own people). They don't take orders, but they do take suggestions. Tehran has influence over them - not control. Let's review.

The Houthis came to our attention in 2023/2024 when they announced a blockade of Israel bound ships. This involved actually striking shipping vessels and even boarding and capturing the Galaxy Leader. The Houthis were the only group outside Palestine that was taking up arms in defense of Gaza. And yet what was Iran doing at this time?  Trying to normalize relations with the House of Saud - the Houthis main nemesis, responsible for Gaza-esque air strikes on Houthi territories. 

I don't want to imply that they are fully independent. I think a lot of Houthis travelled to Iran to learn from the IRGC in the early days. I also think that this training vector now flows both ways and the IRGC is learning a lot from Ansar Allah.  Also, Iran is providing weapons and weapon technology. Iran is almost certainly a major part of the arms smuggling network that keeps the Houthis as deadly as they are.

But this is cooperation or mutual aid. It is not a proxy arrangement.

By contrast, the Yemeni government under the PLC gets payroll from Saudi Arabia. This explains the "ghost soldier" phenomenon you might have been hearing about - Saudi pays salaries for soldiers - whether they exist or not, so an enterprising militia commander can make a little extra on the side. 

Even the southern forces created and funded by the STC - with the UAE kicked out, someone had to pay the salaries of the Southern Giants Brigade. An elite brigade of mercenary fighters with UAE supplied hardware and already based where Saudi Arabia has a lot of "interests"? The same goes for Saleh's National Resistance forces. Meaning that Ansar Allah is the only truly domestic militia. Aligned with Tehran in the Axis of Resistance, but that alignment only goes so far.

Here's the hot take - people who think the Houthis attacked the Saudi pipeline are off their rockers. It was in fact Tehran that ordered the pipeline hit, and specifically to reduce the influence of the Houthis.

Let me explain. The Houthis rush for the coast started on September 3. They abandoned positions around Taiz in a strategy of "lose the desert, gain the coast". By September 10, Mocha had fallen and the Houthis were essentially in full control of Bab Al Mandeb.

Now you might think that Iran was loving this - it made their blockade of Hormuz much more effective being a double blockade that Saudi Arabia could not bypass. And yet on September 11, the east west pipeline through Saudi Arabia was hit (from Iraq). What's the point of this? The Houthis were already blockading Bab Al Mandeb. This was the least important time to hit the pipeline. 

UNLESS - Iran did this explicitly to reduce the Houthis ability to bargain. Iran already had all the leverage it wanted at the time - capturing Bab Al Mandeb was gilding the lily - only the Iranian blockade had turned into a double blockade, meaning that Tehran had to share the leverage over the world economy. But if the pipeline was hit - control over Bab Al Mandeb only impacts the few days of oil in storage on the Red Sea coast. IOW, Tehran activated their Iraqi proxy militia groups to strike the pipeline with the expectation that this would reduce Houthi leverage and Iran would be the sole negotiator for Middle East peace.

This theory discards the lazy Tehran proxy framing and considers the Axis forces as independent if aligned actors. And it explains the nonsensical timing of it all - striking the pipeline when it was the least necessary time to do so.

To be clear - this was not to hurt the Houthis. Tehran remains highly aligned with Sana'a. This was Iran acting to protect its monopoly on negotiating a way out of the current energy crisis. Hitting the pipeline means the only escape hatch for Saudi oil is Hormuz, where Tehran calls the shots.

Yemen Part 2

So what is going on in Yemen today? It's been over a decade of civil war, who are the two sides? Okay, here's what I've managed to put together.

There's the Houthis, led by Abdul Malik al Houthi. Despite the constant framing of them as Iran's proxy, this is arguably the most homegrown domestic faction. If you are reading this, you're probably not surprised that the reality on the ground is the opposite of the stories - but we need to also bear in mind that our own prejudices may cut the other way as well. Despite being the actual anti-imperialist/anti-colonial faction, the stories of them being racist as fuck are true. Their motto literally calls for a curse on all Jews. They are a Zaydi supremacist group with an ideology that posits a bloodline pure imam that will rule The Imamate. Notably however - Abdul Malik does not claim to be this imam. Anyways, take home point is they are seeking to establish a theocratic state with Zaydi Muslims running the show.

That said, my impression is that this is an incredibly pragmatic faction. unlike the Taliban. They are motivated by factors beyond religious fundamentalism, even though religious fundamentalism makes up a lot of the DNA. While they believe in the supremacy of their sect, they are not eliminationist of other faiths, except Jews - super antisemitic these guys, so they aren't innocent of ethnic cleansing. But unlike the stereotype, they are not trying to purge Sunnis or non-Zaydi Shia. They are considered the most Sunni friendly of the various Shia sects. So there's some degree of religious tolerance, so long as you're Muslim. This may be due to their pragmatism - Sunni outnumber Shia in Houthi controlled territory two to one. On the other hand, it has also been part of their origins and has been evident throughout their history - which opens up a huge can of rabbit holes that one may get bogged down in forever.  Suffice to say that the tenets of Zaydi Islam are actually less aligned with authoritarian totalitarianism relative to other groups like the Taliban. Not unaligned, just less aligned. Short version - they aren't as bad as the Taliban - yes this is a very low bar to clear.

I believe they have two sets of goals for Yemen. The first involves purging foreign influence, of which there is plenty and has been immensely damaging to the country. This is the part of their program that is very popular.  The second set involves taking over the country, to become the rulers of all of Yemen. This is the unpopular part of the program. I guess I didn't need to point that out.

BUT - all indications are that Abdul Malik al Houthi is pragmatic. He seems to understand that the Houthi movement has limits in what they can achieve, and it is in careful application of force, respecting those limits - that this one insurgency in one of the poorest nations in the world has managed to hold the global economy hostage. And despite the Zaydi supremacist mindset, I believe he understands that ruling over all of Yemen is impossible. The non-Zaydi populations in other regions are still Yemeni - with the resilience and resistance that this implies. He knows that empires with infinite resources have attempted it and failed. That Yemen is a nation built on overthrowing oppressors, so that would be an uncomfortable position to step into. In short, I think Houthi leadership is susceptible to being bribed into peace.

The other side is the Internationally Recognized Government. Just to illustrate what "Internationally Recognized" means - territory under Houthi control make up 70% to 80% of the population - but since that remaining rump is made mostly of colonial proxies, guess which gets recognized.

The Internationally Recognized Government consists of two factions - the Saudi owned northern faction based out of Marib and the UAE owned faction based out of the rural areas around Aden. Despite Aden being the interim capital of this government, the Marib faction is dominant and the southern faction (which used to be the Southern Transitional Council or STC) is in decline. The leader of the STC has fled to Abu Dhabi under accusations of treason - the STC was a separatist faction, so that's likely where that comes from. 

Just to make things more confusing, what used to be the STC itself is also two factions. The people living in Aden itself, an urbanized cosmopolitan population shaped by over a century of being a British colony, and the more rural tribes in the surround region who are much more like mercenaries under the employ of the UAE. But with the collapse of the STC, this separatist movement is on the rocks.

The UAE is effectively kicked out of Yemen, so the STC is no longer viable with no one paying the bills.  The Marib faction is facing similar issues - Saudi Arabia is desperate to withdraw. They do not want to continue pouring more and more money into Yemen with no hopes of success.  They need to cut a deal with Yemen in its entirety, and that includes Houthis.

Yemen Part 1

Made it a year before the voices forced me back to rant here.  So unsurprisingly, it's going to be a long one.

First to open with a couple caveats. The minor one - I only knew a little bit about Yemen before the Houthis started blockading Israeli ships coming through the Red Sea - while I've "done my own research" since then - this is by no means anything close to representing a decent amateur's understanding, let alone an expert's. More important caveat - the previous one doesn't matter. The only important opinions on what happens to Yemen are Yemeni - which I am not.

Okay - the main issue is that Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the world, despite having substantial oil deposits and a strategic location on one of the world's most important shipping routes. That poverty is mostly inflicted by external forces. 100% due to external forces putting the nation under blockade and a decade of bombing runs. And split responsibility (but mostly foreign influenced) for a decade long civil war mostly fueled by those same external forces.

Yemen is an ancient civilization, and a proud one, and as we are coming to learn, an incredibly resilient one. The nation has been subject to crazy waves of imperialist colonization, all broken by the many factors which make it ungovernable. I've identified the brutal terrain and the fragmented tribal groups and resulting complex network of relationships therein - but again - not even a decent amateur's understanding of the country, so there are likely more. It's resisted the Ottomans, the British, and the Russians. It's currently got Saudi and Emirati meddling - neither of which are going to last - although they have caused immense damage tied to that decade long civil war.

And yet despite it all, the Yemenis have resisted - although they have been forced into deeply fundamentalist nationalist groups for survival and to push out the colonizers, earning it the nickname "Graveyard of Empires".  Sound familiar? Kind of reminiscent of Afghanistan if you ask me. And that should serve as a big flashing warning sign to the international community - we're creating a new Taliban here. And both Ansar Allah and Al Islah aren't that far off already.

More importantly though, even after a brutal civil war claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, both these groups still identify as Yemeni. The Yemeni national identity is real and incredibly durable - also not unlike Afghanistan.

It's a nation that has taken what imperialist colonial empires can throw at it and still remains strong today. Strong enough to enforce a blockade on global trade that has real and meaningful effects - despite being one of the poorest countries in the world. So what needs to happen is that instead of meddling, foreign powers (and domestic ones too) have to recognize that "owning" Yemen is impossible. Many empires tried and they all failed. And more importantly, an "owned" Yemen - some sort of colony forced to pay tribute - this is less beneficial not only for the Yemenis but for whichever sucker empire wants to pout untold resources and lives into the impossible task of pacifying the locals. Far better to support and foster an independent Yemen, one that rebuilds with its oil wealth and then cements its place in the global community with its maintenance of one of the world's most important trade routes.